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Wishful Mnemonics and Autonomous
Killing Machines
Since 19th century military theorist
Carl von Clausewitz first coined the
phrase ‘the fog of war’1, the prob-
lem of how adequately to interpret un-
folding events in the field of battle
has been placed explicitly at the cen-
tre of military affairs. At the same
time, 20th century developments in
military technologies towards increas-
ingly ‘network-centric’ warfare, along
with accelerating initiatives in battle-
field automation, have resulted in ever
more tightly coupled systems of situa-
tion assessment and response2. While
the premise that the deployment of
information and communications tech-
nologies would help to dispel the uncer-
tainties of warfare is now in question3,
developments in battlefield automation




Under current military policy, the de-
ployment of armed robots requires that
human operators take decisions on the
application of lethal force. Over the
last decade, however, the ‘Roadmaps’
of United States forces have made clear
the desire and intention to develop and
use autonomous battlefield robots4.
The US Department of Defense Un-
manned Systems Integrated Roadmap
2011–2036 describes the advantages of
autonomous over existing automatic
systems:
“Dramatic progress in supporting
technologies suggests that unprece-
dented levels of autonomy can be in-
troduced into current and future un-
manned systems. . . Automatic systems
are fully preprogrammed and act re-
peatedly and independently of external
influence or control. . . However, the
automatic system is not able to define
the path according to some given goal
or to choose the goal dictating its path.
By contrast, autonomous systems are
self-directed toward a goal in that they
do not require outside control, but
rather are governed by laws and strate-
gies that direct their behavior. . . The
special feature of an autonomous sys-
tem is its ability to be goal-directed in
unpredictable situations. This ability
is a significant improvement in capa-
bility compared to the capabilities of
automatic systems”5.
While there are assurances that
“[f]or the foreseeable future, decisions
over the use of force and the choice of
which individual targets to engage with
lethal force will be retained under hu-
man control in unmanned systems”6,
these are countered by the emphasis
throughout these reports on the ben-
efits of increased autonomy, and re-
search and development aimed at tak-
ing the human out of the control loop
is well underway. The end goal is a net-
work of aerial, land, and underwater
robots that will operate together au-
tonomously to locate their targets and
destroy them without human interven-
tion. The US is not the only country,
moreover, with autonomous robots in
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their sights: China, Russia, Israel and
the UK are following suit.
At the same time, nation states en-
gaged in armed conflict remain ac-
countable in principle to the require-
ments of International Humanitarian
Law (IHL)7. A major question that
arises within this legal framework is
the ability of autonomous armed robot
systems to distinguish between com-
batants and non-combatants, or other
protected actors such as combatants
who are wounded or have surrendered.
There are systems currently in use that
have a weak form of discrimination.
The Israeli Harpy, as one example, is
a loitering munition that detects radar
signals. When it finds one, it references
its database to determine if the signal is
friendly and if not, it targets the radar.
This type of discrimination relies, how-
ever, on the accuracy of the database,
and fails as well to take into account
the context of the signal; for example,
whether the radar is positioned on an
anti-aircraft station, or on the roof of a
school or a hospital8.
In the current state of the art, robots
lack three components required to en-
sure compliance with International Hu-
manitarian Law. The first concerns
the Principle of Distinction9, which
would require that robots have ade-
quate vision or other sensory process-
ing systems for separating combatants
from civilians, particularly in circum-
stances where the former are not in
uniform, and for reliably differentiat-
ing wounded or surrendering combat-
ants from those who pose an immi-
nent threat. Sensors such as cam-
eras, infrared, sonars, lasers, temper-
ature sensors, ladars and the like may
be able to tell us that something is a
human, but they cannot tell us much
else. There are systems currently in
the labs that can recognize still faces
matched against a database, and they
might eventually be deployed for in-
dividual targeting in limited circum-
stance. But British teenagers beat
surveillance cameras simply by wearing
hooded jackets. And how accurate will
facial recognition systems be with mov-
ing targets, or targets tracked dynami-
cally from the air?
The more basic problem in meet-
ing the requirements of the Principle
of Distinction is that we do not have
an adequate definition of a civilian
that can be translated into a recogni-
tion algorithm. Nor can we get one
from the Laws of War. The 1949
Geneva Convention requires the use of
‘common sense,’ while the 1977 Pro-
tocol I essentially defines a civilian in
the negative sense, as someone who
is not a combatant10. Even if ma-
chines had adequate sensing mecha-
nisms to detect the difference between
civilians and uniform-wearing military,
they would fail under situations of con-
temporary warfare where combatants
are frequently not in uniform. While
robotics may move towards some lim-
ited sensory and visual discrimination
in certain narrowly constrained cir-
cumstances within the next 50 years,
human level discrimination with ade-
quate common sense reasoning and sit-
uational awareness may prove compu-
tationally intractable11. At this point,
at least, there is no evidence or research
results to suggest otherwise.
A second IHL issue is the Princi-
ple of Proportionality12. One robotics
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expert has argued that robots could
calculate proportionality better than
humans13; however this concerns what
we might call the easy proportionality
problem: that is, minimising collateral
damage by choosing the most appro-
priate weapon or munition and direct-
ing it accurately according to a spec-
ified target. The hard proportionality
problem is making the decision about
whether to apply lethal or kinetic force
in a particular context in the first place.
What is the balance between loss of
civilian lives and expected military ad-
vantage? Will a particular strike ben-
efit military objectives, or hinder them
because of its effects on the local civil-
ian population? The list of questions is
open-ended. It is a qualitative judg-
ment regarding what cost in civilian
injury is proportional to direct mili-
tary advantage. It is imperative that
such decisions are made by responsi-
ble, accountable human commanders
who can weigh the options based on
experience and on adequate situational
awareness. As Col. David M. Sullivan,
an Air Force pilot with extensive expe-
rience with both traditional and drone
airstrikes from Kosovo to Afghanistan,
told Discover magazine; ‘If I were going
to speak to the robotics and artificial
intelligence people, I would ask, “How
will they build software to scratch that
gut instinct or sixth sense?” Combat is
not black-and-white’14.
A third issue, which cuts across these
two, is that of accountability. A robot
does not have moral agency and conse-
quently cannot be held accountable for
its actions. Robert Sparrow15 argues
that irresolvable ambiguities surround-
ing questions of responsibility for ac-
tions taken in the case of artificially in-
telligent robotic weapons (particularly
in relation to the automation of target
identification) render their deployment
irremediably unethical. Anderson and
Waxman16 dismiss the accountability
objection out of hand, on the grounds
that ‘post-hoc judicial accountability in
war is just one of many mechanisms
for promoting and enforcing compli-
ance with the laws of war’. But at the
least the question of responsibility is
vastly complicated in the case of au-
tonomous robot weapons, and deploy-
ing a weapon without a clear chain of
accountability is not a morally defensi-
ble option.
It is on the basis of these three con-
cerns that we call for a ban on au-
tonomous lethal targeting by robots17.
A major stumbling block to a prohibi-
tion on the development of armed au-
tonomous robots, however, is the claim
by proponents of lethal autonomous
robots that there are technological
‘fixes’ that will make them behave more
ethically and more humanely than sol-
diers on the battlefield. We argue that
this has more to do with the language
being used to describe robots, than
with what robots can actually do.
Anthropomorphism and
wishful mnemonics in AI
Robots have been depicted in science
fiction, in media reporting, and by
some robotics experts as sentient ma-
chines that can reason and act in ways
superior to humans, as well as feel emo-
tions and desires. This plays upon
our natural tendency to attribute hu-
man or animal properties and mental
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states (anthropomorphism or zoomor-
phism) to inanimate objects that move
in animal-like ways18. We are all sus-
ceptible to this. Journalists are partic-
ularly caught up in these forms of at-
tribution, as they know that their read-
ers love it. Within the field of AI and
robotics as well, it is acceptable and
even customary to describe robots with
an anthropomorphic narrative. While
this can be harmless in casual conver-
sations in the lab, it is a perilous basis
for legal and political discussion about
enabling autonomous lethal machines.
In an influential paper, Drew Mc-
Dermott, Professor of AI at Yale Uni-
versity, expressed concern that the dis-
cipline of AI could ultimately be dis-
credited by researchers using natural
language mnemonics such as ‘UNDER-
STAND’ to describe aspects of their
programs19. Such terms represent
a researcher’s aspirations, he argues,
rather than what the programs actu-
ally do. McDermott called such as-
pirational terms ‘wishful mnemonics’,
and suggested that in using them, the
researcher ‘may mislead a lot of peo-
ple, most prominently himself’, by mis-
attributing understanding to the pro-
gram. McDermott suggests, instead,
that we use names such as ’G0034,’ and
then see if it is as easy to argue that the
program implements ‘understanding’.
The combination of anthropomor-
phism and wishful mnemonics, we
would suggest, underwrites the pro-
gramme of roboticist Ronald Arkin,
who states: ‘it is a thesis of my on-
going research for the U.S. Army that
robots not only can be better than sol-
diers in conducting warfare in certain
circumstances, but they also can be
more humane in the battlefield than
humans’20. Anthropomorphic terms
like ‘humane’, when applied to ma-
chines, carry along with them a rich,
interconnected web of concepts that are
not technically part of a computer sys-
tem or how it operates. We need to ask:
How would ‘humaneness’ be specified
programmatically, and then matched
appropriately to an open horizon of
contingent situations?21
While Arkin cites lack of fear as one
element that could ensure the greater
humanity of battlefield robots, he also
states that ‘in order for an autonomous
agent to be truly ethical, emotions may
be required at some level’ 22. More
specifically, he suggests that if the
robot ‘behaves unethically’, the system
might alter its behaviour with an ‘affec-
tive function’ such as guilt, remorse or
grief23. Arkin models guilt as a ‘single
affective variable’ designated V guilt.
This is a single number that increases
each time ‘perceived ethical violations
occur’ (for which the machine relies on
human input). When V guilt reaches a
threshold, the machine will no longer
fire its weapon, just as a thermostat
cuts out the heat when the temperature
reaches a certain value. Arkin presents
this in the form of an equation:
IF Vguilt > Maxguilt
THEN Pl-ethical = 0
where V guilt represents the current
scalar value of the affective state of
guilt, and Maxguilt is a threshold
constant24. This term, guilt, carries
with it all of the connotations that a
more neutral term, such as ‘weapons
disabler’, would not.
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Arkin assumes, inter alia, that the
Laws of Armed Conflict and Rules of
Engagement resolve questions of ethi-
cal conduct in war fighting, and could
be effectively encoded within the con-
trol architecture of a robotic system25.
Arkin then wishes us to accept that fol-
lowing a set of programmed rules to
minimize collateral damage will make a
robot itself compassionate: ‘by requir-
ing the autonomous system to abide
strictly to [the laws of war] and [rules of
engagement], we contend that it does
exhibit compassion: for civilians, the
wounded, civilian property, other non-
combatants’26. Peter Asaro, in con-
trast, in considering the programmabil-
ity of the laws of war, draws on Just
War Theory, the principles underlying
most of the international laws regulat-
ing warfare, including the Geneva and
Hague Conventions27. Asaro reminds
us that the Laws of Armed Conflict
comprise what he characterizes as a
‘menagerie’ of international laws and
agreements (such as the Geneva Con-
ventions), treaties (such as the anti-
personnel landmine ban), and domes-
tic laws, and the Rules of Engagement
(ROE) rest on the principles of dis-
crimination and proportionality. As
Asaro explains; ‘the ROE are devised
to instruct soldiers in specific situa-
tions, and take into account not only le-
gal restrictions but also political, pub-
lic relations, and strategic military con-
cerns. . . They often appear ambiguous
or vague to the soldiers on the ground
who observe situations that do not al-
ways fall neatly into the distinctions
made by lawyers’, while the Principle of
Proportionality is ‘abstract, not easily
quantified, and highly relative to spe-
cific contexts and subjective estimates
of value’28. These are far from algorith-
mic specifications for decision-making
and action, in other words, not least (as
in the case of recent contests over who
is protected under the Geneva Conven-
tions) over the identification of a ‘com-
batant.’
We must be wary, in sum, of ac-
cepting ‘wishful mnemonics’ at face
value, ensuring rather that the under-
lying computational mechanisms actu-
ally support the functions named, in
other than name only. To do other-
wise could result in a dangerous obfus-
cation of the actual technical limits of
autonomous armed and lethal robots.
It is not difficult to imagine the im-
pact on lawmakers, politicians and mil-
itary decision-makers if they are led to
believe that lethal autonomous robots
can have affective states such as guilt
and compassion to inform their moral
reasoning. The premise of the ‘ethical
robot soldier’ being more humane than
humans has spread throughout the me-
dia and appears almost weekly in the
press. These representations add cre-
dence to the notion that there is a tech-
nological fix around the corner that will
solve the real moral problems of uneth-
ical behaviour in warfare, through the
automation of lethality. Rather than
hoping for technological solutions, we
need to direct attention and funding to
understanding under what conditions
the legal and ethical reasoning of hu-
man soldiers fails in warfare, and work
to mitigate those conditions as well as
to provide better training, closer mon-
itoring and greater responsibility and
accountability for military actions.
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Prohibiting the develop-
ment of lethal autonomy
It is our position that discussion about
the limitations and risks of autonomous
armed robots should come upstream
and early enough to halt costly ac-
quisition and development programs.
It could be argued that there are al-
ready relevant weapons laws in place,
such as Article 36 of Additional Pro-
tocol I29. With the current drive to-
wards autonomous operation, why has
there not yet been any state determina-
tion as to whether autonomous robot
employment, in some or all circum-
stances, is prohibited by Protocol I?
This is a requirement of Article 36 for
the study, development, acquisition or
adoption of any new weapon. Bolton,
Nash and Moyes30 argue for the rele-
vance of this legal framework to a ban
on autonomous armed robots, in terms
of their comparability to anti-personnel
landmines with respect to problems of
autonomy and inadequate discrimina-
tion of their targets:
“In banning anti-personnel land-
mines the global humanitarian commu-
nity acted to address a military tech-
nology that has caused extensive suf-
fering to civilians, but is also a weapon
type that raises particular moral con-
cerns because of the way in which
it functions. . .Weapons that are trig-
gered automatically by the presence or
proximity of their victim can rarely be
used in a way that ensures distinction
between military and civilian”.
These questions are made more ur-
gent insofar as, if one state gains strong
military advantage from using armed
lethal autonomous robots, there is lit-
tle to inhibit other states from follow-
ing suit. Yet nation states are not even
discussing the current robot arms race.
On the contrary, US military contrac-
tors have lobbied to have export re-
strictions loosened to open foreign mar-
kets. On September 5th, 2012, the
Department of Defense announced new
guidelines to allow 66 unspecified coun-
tries to buy American-made unmanned
air systems.
Perhaps the most promising ap-
proach would be to adopt the model
created by coalitions of NGOs to pro-
hibit the use of other indiscriminate
weapons. The 1997 mine-ban treaty
was signed by 133 nations to prohibit
the use of anti-personnel mines, and
107 nations adopted the Convention on
Cluster Munitions in 2008. Although a
number of countries including the U.S.,
Russia and China did not sign these
treaties, there has been little substan-
tial use of these weapons since and the
treaty provisions could eventually be-
come customary law.
Conclusion
It is incumbent upon scientists and
engineers, particularly in the military
context, to work to ensure that the
terminology that they use to describe
their systems to funders, policy mak-
ers and the media does not resort to
unsubstantiated anthropomorphism or
wishful mnemonics. We must be wary
of evocative terms that imply the func-
tionality of programs (e.g., ethical gov-
ernor, guilt functions, etc.) rather
than provide technical descriptions of
actually-existing capabilities. More
generally, it is important that the in-
ternational community acts now while
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there is still a window of opportunity
to stop or, at the very least discuss
the control and limits of, the roboti-
sation of the battlespace and the in-
creasing automation of killing. In our
view a global ban on the development
and deployment of autonomous lethal
targeting is the best course of action,
both legally and morally. We have
argued here that notions about ethi-
cal robot soldiers are still in the realm
of conjecture and should not be con-
sidered as a viable possibility within
the framework necessary to control the
development and proliferation of au-
tonomous armed robots. Rather than
making war more humane and ethi-
cal, autonomous armed robotic systems
comprise a step too far in the automa-
tion, and associated dehumanization,
of warfare. Rather than turning to fur-
ther automation in the face of the in-
tensifying uncertainties of warfare, and
the persistent occurrence of extra- or
illegal actions in the conduct of killing,
we must renew our efforts to ensure
that humans are held responsible for
decisions regarding the use of violent
force upon other human beings.
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